From Hub-and-Spoke to Network: Rethinking Japanese Diplomacy Through Why I Am Learning Chinese

Introduction: Why I Am Learning Chinese

I have recently started studying Chinese in earnest. Not for the sake of relations with China, but to work with Singapore and the countries of Southeast Asia around it.

About three quarters of Singapore’s citizens are ethnically Chinese, and Chinese (Huayu) is one of its official languages. Malaysia also has a large Chinese community, and the Chinese networks in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam are important knots that tie together the region’s business. In Southeast Asia, Chinese is “one of the languages of this region” before it is “the language of China.”

While thinking about this choice, I noticed something. What I am trying to do with Chinese and what Japan’s diplomacy lacks today have the same shape. Here I would like to start from one individual’s choice of language and think about the shape of Japanese diplomacy itself.

English as the Only Hub: A Personal Hub-and-Spoke

For many Japanese, “foreign language” means English. And that English is, more often than not, American English. Even our neighbors tend to be understood through English-language media and Western frameworks.

In other words, almost every line between Japanese people and the world is drawn through English. One language sits at the center, and lines radiate out from it to every region. A person’s international outlook can have a hub-and-spoke shape, too.

Learning Chinese to use it in Southeast Asia means drawing, by oneself, a line that does not pass through that hub. It does not mean abandoning English. In fact, I build my Chinese with English as the circuit. That also fits better with the way people in Singapore speak, moving back and forth between English and Huayu every day.

A network does not mean having no center. It means not relying on a single one. I would like to make this distinction the axis of what follows.

The Shape of Japan’s Diplomacy: Hub-and-Spoke Around the United States

The same shape appears in the state’s diplomacy. In her first phone call with President Trump, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that “strengthening the Japan–US alliance is the top priority” of her foreign and security policy. True to those words, her government’s first year has revolved around the United States.

Of course, Japan has been active beyond the US as well. Takaichi met South Korean President Lee Jae-myung four times in about six months. In May she announced an updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific in Hanoi; in June she held a summit with the EU; in July she reached agreements with India on defense and economic security. Judged by the number of meetings alone, it is not “only America.”

The problem is the shape of the relationships. Cooperation with South Korea, support for Southeast Asia, economic security with Europe — all are positioned as “parts for facing the same direction as the US” in deterring China. The lines between Japan and each country take on meaning only by passing through the American hub. This is what I mean by “hub-and-spoke around the United States.”

That shape also shows in the gaps in temperature with partners. President Lee repeatedly calls for trilateral dialogue among Japan, China and South Korea, while Prime Minister Takaichi speaks of Japan–US–South Korea and does not mention the Japan–China–Korea framework. The European think tank ECFR warns that as Japan leans toward Washington, Europe risks being pushed to the margins of Japan’s resource diplomacy.

And then there is China. Since the Diet answer on a Taiwan contingency in November 2025, Japan–China relations have been frozen for a full year. China demands a retraction, later a “correction”; Japan repeats that it will not retract. No back channel to bridge the gap is visible. Even at this month’s APEC, no Japan–China summit is scheduled.

Japan as Seen from Southeast Asia

From Southeast Asia, this hub-and-spoke shape looks like Japan whittling away its own greatest asset.

The 2026 edition of the annual elite survey by Singapore’s ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute showed three things.

  • If forced to choose between the US and China, 52% chose China and 48% the US.
  • Concern over President Trump’s foreign policy overtook China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea as the region’s top worry.
  • Amid this, Japan, trusted by 65.6%, remained the most trusted partner.

Yet Southeast Asia’s real wish is not to choose at all. 55.2% said ASEAN should focus on its own resilience and unity. Southeast Asia is not picking a camp. It is adding options.

Japan is trusted for its reputation as a responsible country that respects international law, and for its long record of economic and development cooperation. In other words, Japan’s value lies not in being America’s lieutenant, but in being a trustworthy third option that is neither the US nor China. Now that distrust of the US has become the region’s top concern, the more Japan looks fused with the US, the more of that asset it loses.

After the Taiwan remarks, China gathered Southeast Asian ambassadors and urged them to fall in line. Only Myanmar officially condemned Japan. Southeast Asia did not side with China. But nor does it want to be mobilized onto Japan’s side.

At this month’s ASEAN-related summits in Manila, the chair, the Philippines, reined in anti-China rhetoric within its own government to keep tensions down. On the Quad leaders’ summit being held in Manila for the first time, Australia’s Lowy Institute wrote that it is not the Quad propping up ASEAN centrality, but ASEAN centrality propping up the Quad. The initiative lies with Southeast Asia.

The Limits of Hub-and-Spoke: When the Hub Wobbles

The weakness of hub-and-spoke is simple. When the hub wobbles, everything wobbles. And right now, the hub is wobbling.

President Trump is deepening his relationship with President Xi Jinping. According to reports, he has even asked Prime Minister Takaichi to soften her stance on China. At this month’s APEC a US–China–Russia summit is planned, and there are concerns that Japan may become a common target under the narrative of the Second World War’s “fight against fascism.” In the US midterm elections on November 3, the Republicans were reported to have suffered a heavy defeat, weakening President Trump’s standing at home.

Diplomacy that leans on personal rapport rises and falls in value with the other side’s circumstances. If the hub moves by striking deals, Japan cannot stand on its own lines alone.

Furthermore, this shape of diplomacy is bound up with the shape of domestic politics. When the government took office, its support was broad. Younger voters in particular gathered out of economic hopes. But disappointment over prices drove that group away, and the approval rating came to rest on a bedrock of ideological supporters. What that bedrock dislikes most is flexibility toward China.

The narrower the domestic base, the more rigidly diplomacy sets into hub-and-spoke. If relations with China stay frozen, the economy suffers through rare earths and tourism. That, in turn, pushes swing voters further away. Domestic politics and diplomacy are two sides of the same vicious circle.

The Ultra-Conservatives’ Greatest Weakness: They Cannot See Southeast Asia

From the standpoint of a network, the greatest weakness of Japan’s ultra-conservatives is not being hard-line on China as such. It is that they look only at China and the United States, and do not see Southeast Asia. As a result, they cut the knots of Japan’s network from the inside. This shows up in three ways.

The first is seeing the world as a binary choice. Japan and the US, or China. Friend or foe. In this scheme, Southeast Asia appears only as “the front line against China.” But Southeast Asia itself says it wants to choose neither. A binary worldview has no room to hear that voice.

The second is historical memory. Southeast Asia remembers the Japanese occupation. That memory is not abstract textbook history. It lives on today, attached to concrete places and dates.

Singapore was renamed “Syonan-to” and lived under Japanese rule for about three and a half years. Right after its fall in February 1942, the Japanese army rounded up Chinese men, “screened” them, and executed many. Locally this is called the Sook Ching (“purge”), and it later extended to the Malay Peninsula. Postwar Japanese investigations and Kempeitai reports put the death toll at 5,000 to 6,000, while Singaporean estimates range from 25,000 to 50,000. On February 15, 1967 — exactly 25 years after the fall — Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew unveiled the Memorial to the Civilian Victims of the Japanese Occupation. Every February 15, a memorial service is still held before it.

In the Philippines, about 100,000 civilians died in the Battle of Manila from February to March 1945, most of them attributed to massacres by Japanese troops. Manila became, alongside Berlin and Warsaw, one of the most devastated capitals of the war. Indonesia remembers the people mobilized as forced laborers, the romusha. The construction of the Thai–Burma Railway consumed not only Allied prisoners of war but also large numbers of laborers gathered from across Southeast Asia.

Memory does not live only in memorials. Traces of the occupation remain in stories passed down within families, and in everyday words and habits. Some, like the Peranakan writer Lee Su Kim, keep writing that memory as literature. Yet most such works have never been translated into Japanese. When revisionists say “the witnesses are gone,” they are counting only witnesses inside Japan. Southeast Asia’s memory has not disappeared. It simply has not reached Japan.

Postwar Japan rebuilt its relations with Southeast Asia by starting from this memory. Reparations and economic cooperation from the 1950s were the beginning. Even so, in January 1974, when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Bangkok and Jakarta, backlash against Japan’s economic expansion sparked fierce anti-Japanese demonstrations, which in Jakarta escalated into riots (the Malari incident). The turning point came in 1977. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda pledged that Japan would not become a military power, that it would build “heart-to-heart” relations of trust, and that it would be an equal partner. This “Fukuda Doctrine” is still regarded as the foundation of Japan–ASEAN relations.

Today’s 65.6% trust rests on half a century of such efforts. That is exactly why discourse that tries to minimize Japan’s wartime aggression destroys that foundation and feeds the “new militarism” narrative China is spreading. When the US, China and Russia stage their solidarity “against fascism,” the most helpful voice of all is the revisionism of Japan’s own ultra-conservatives.

The third is the attitude toward foreigners. As of October 2025, about 2.57 million foreign nationals were working in Japan. The largest group by nationality is Vietnamese, at about 600,000, followed by about 260,000 Filipinos, with workers from Myanmar and Indonesia rising sharply. The thickest human network linking Japan and Southeast Asia already exists inside Japan. Meanwhile, some analysts argue that dissatisfaction with policy on foreign residents forms a social foundation of support for the Takaichi government. Words that describe foreigners as a threat travel straight to families in Vietnam and the Philippines.

All three erode the trust Japan has built in Southeast Asia. While talking about partnership with Southeast Asia for the sake of deterring China, they undermine the very foundation of that partnership. This is the ultra-conservatives’ greatest contradiction, seen from the standpoint of a network. Of course, not everyone who calls themselves conservative is like this. The problem is that the more a government depends on these voices, the more its entire diplomacy takes on that contradiction.

What a Network Is

The counterpart to hub-and-spoke is a network. Japan and Australia, Japan and Europe, Japan and ASEAN, Japan and South Korea are connected by lines that hold without passing through the United States. Those lines are tied to one another as well. The US may be one large node in that network, but it is not the only center.

There is a precedent for this in Japan itself. When the first Trump administration withdrew from the TPP, Japan brought the remaining eleven countries together and put the CPTPP into force. Japan showed that the network survives even when the hub drops out. Likewise, the Abe government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific was accepted by many countries because it was a Japanese vision that the US later joined.

Another model is Singapore. As a small city-state, it has survived by keeping knots at equal distance with the US, with China, and with neighbors such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Its citizens, too, move between English and Huayu, Malay or Tamil, and belong to several communities at once. The shape of the state’s diplomacy and the shape of individuals’ languages and belongings mirror each other.

A network is not “siding with no one.” It is a structure that does not collapse when any single knot is cut.

Proposals: From Hub-and-Spoke to Network

What Japanese diplomacy needs is not adjustments to individual policies. It needs to switch its underlying design from US-centered hub-and-spoke to a network. Whichever government is in charge, I would like to propose the following seven points.

  1. Reposition the Japan–US alliance from “the only center” to “the largest node.” The weight of the alliance does not change. What changes is the attitude toward every other relationship: cultivating each as an end in itself, not as a supplement to ties with Washington.
  2. Treat Southeast Asia as an equal knot, not as “the front line against China.” Respect ASEAN centrality, and offer support for a South China Sea code of conduct, maritime law-enforcement capacity, and energy and supply-chain cooperation as ways for each country to widen its own options. Taking care not to bring the Japan–China confrontation into the region’s forums is part of this.
  3. Let Japan itself drive East Asia’s multilateral frameworks. The Japan–China–South Korea summit, which Japan is due to host, remains stalled. With South Korea’s cooperation, Japan should seek to restart it from practical fields such as the economy, disaster prevention and the environment. The same goes for ASEAN+3.
  4. Thicken the lines with middle powers that do not pass through the US. Tie relations with Europe, Australia, Canada, South Korea and India as independent lines. Expanding the CPTPP and economic-security cooperation with the EU can serve as the foundation.
  5. Divide the labor between principle and channel in China policy. The prime minister states principles in public; an envoy acting on her behalf works out the landing point behind the scenes. Designing a “correction that is not a retraction” — for example, the prime minister restating the wording of the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué in her own words — is also part of the craft of diplomatic language.
  6. Redirect diplomatic language from the domestic base back to the other country. The meaning of diplomatic words is set not only by what is said, but by when, in what order, and to whom. The yardstick should be not “how to say it” but “how it lands with the other side and how the relationship moves.” Ambiguity is not weakness; it is a tool to be used deliberately.
  7. Cultivate a network within society. Broaden foreign-language education beyond English alone, and widen the paths for learning Chinese, Korean and Southeast Asian languages. Support study abroad, ties between local governments, and private-sector bridge-builders, building up human connections that endure even when relations between states freeze.

The last point is in fact the most fundamental. Politicians and diplomats emerge from the linguistic sense and worldview of their society. If networks do not grow among individuals, the state cannot weave one either.

Extending the Network Worldwide: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America

The network is not only about the Asia-Pacific. Relations with the Middle East, Africa and Latin America are where Japan is truly tested on how many lines it can draw without passing through the US. Like Southeast Asia, these are countries of the Global South that refuse to be forced to choose sides.

The Middle East: the value of a channel separate from America’s. About 94% of Japan’s crude oil came from the Middle East, most of it through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran war and the closure of the strait turned that fragility into reality. Japan has traditionally been one of the few countries able to talk with both the Gulf states and Iran. Not being a party to America’s war is a diplomatic asset for securing resources. Simply switching to American crude would only deepen the hub-and-spoke in energy as well. Widening the supply network to the Gulf, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, while keeping Japan’s own channel of dialogue with Iran, is the network’s answer.

Africa: “creating together,” not “countering China.” In 1993 Japan led the world by launching the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). Yet its economic presence is small: in 2024 Japan’s exports to Africa were about $8.5 billion, against China’s $178 billion. Competing with China on the volume of money is not realistic. Worse, the more Japan’s Africa policy is seen as “a policy to counter China,” the harder it becomes to win African trust. Japan’s strength lies in long-term engagement such as human-resource development, disaster prevention and institution-building. Triangular lines that pass through neither the US nor China are also possible, such as working with India to build an economic sphere spanning the Indian Ocean.

Latin America: the human knot of Nikkei communities. In June 2026, Japan and Mercosur agreed to launch negotiations on an economic partnership agreement. Brazil’s rare earths and Argentina’s lithium can become knots that reduce dependence on China. Above all, Brazil is home to one of the largest Japanese-descendant communities outside Japan, and Japanese Brazilians live in Japan as well. A human network already exists, ahead of any intergovernmental agreement.

What the three regions have in common is that Japan is wanted not as “America’s ally” but as “a partner who stays for the long run without imposing.” A bridge-builder that turns Western ideals into practical solutions. That is a role hub-and-spoke diplomacy cannot produce.

Answering Likely Objections

These proposals will naturally draw objections. Let me take up three of the main ones.

“Against the Chinese threat, only the US can actually defend Japan.” That is true. And that is exactly why I am not saying Japan should weaken the alliance. Deterrence is the alliance’s job; stability is the network’s. Rely on the US alone, and Japan loses its footing the moment Washington trades away Japanese interests in a deal. The network is not a substitute for the alliance, but insurance for when the alliance wavers.

“A network makes Japan a fair-weather friend to all, trusted by none.” A network does not mean blurring one’s values. It means holding firm to principles such as the rule of law and free trade, and linking directly, without going through the US, with those who share them. Japan is the most trusted partner in Southeast Asia precisely because of this stance: “principled, but not imposing.”

“Flexibility toward China will look like caving in to pressure.” Caving in and having channels are different things. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took a firm line on China while keeping channels of dialogue open through senior party figures and his aides. Diplomacy means moving a relationship without bending principles; having no options beyond “retract or don’t” is not strength but stalemate.

Of course, weaving a network takes time. With tensions with China running high, the argument for prioritizing deterrence that works now has merit. But deterrence and networks are not alternatives to choose between; they are to be built up in parallel.

The Greatest Concern: Two Closed Feedback Loops

If we follow the problems traced so far to their root, the greatest concern comes down to two things. One is that Japan’s diplomatic judgments lack the yardstick of “how this lands with the other side.” The other is that the prime minister’s convictions and her calculations for staying in power point toward one and the same center.

The first is a closed external loop. Without a circuit that feeds the other country’s reaction back into one’s own judgment, backlash is read not as a sign of failure but as proof of being right — just as China’s anger at the Taiwan remarks was received at home as evidence of a prime minister who does not waver.

The second is a closed internal loop. When conviction and calculation point in different directions, each restrains the other. They prompt the question: “This is what I believe, but will our relationships hold if I act on it?” But when both point to the same center — the United States — no brake works inside the government.

The recent debate over the “no introduction” part of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles shows both loops closing at once. The question has been narrowed to a single point: what helps US nuclear deterrence. What it would mean for Southeast Asia’s nuclear-weapon-free zone, or for the disarmament ties Japan has built as the only country to have suffered atomic bombing, goes unasked. There are cautious voices within the LDP that weigh the reactions of neighboring countries, yet a senior government official, on the very first day of ruling-coalition talks, spoke as if spelling out an exception were already settled. Voices from outside and from within are being swept aside before they can reach the decision.

Many diplomatic failures arise less from wrong decisions themselves than from closed loops that keep anyone from noticing the mistake. The proposals can therefore be distilled into opening these two loops. Opening the external loop is the network: being directly connected to many partners, so that their voices come back. Opening the internal loop means building people with perspectives different from the prime minister’s, and other currents within the party, into the decision-making process.

Conclusion: The Networks Individuals Weave

It is precisely when a state’s diplomacy has hardened into hub-and-spoke that individual networks matter most. Even when leaders are deadlocked, personal ties in business, scholarship and culture remain. The improvement in Japan–South Korea relations, too, rests not only on moves between governments but on travel between the two countries, which reached a record of about 13 million people in 2025.

I am learning Chinese to add one small knot. A line that links Japan, Singapore, and the people of Southeast Asia who speak Huayu, without passing through either the English-speaking world or China. One person’s strength is small. But if more people draw such lines, the shape of a society’s international outlook changes. And so, in time, does the outlook of the politicians and diplomats who emerge from that society.

From hub-and-spoke to network. That shift begins not only in the Prime Minister’s Office, but also in which languages each of us learns, and with whom we connect.

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